<cipe-l,AT,inka,DOT,de>,"Hans Steegers" <hsx,AT,dds,DOT,nl>|
Re: What do you guys think about this?|
Allan Latham <alatham,AT,flexsys-group,DOT,com>|
Wed, 24 Sep 2003 09:23:53 +0200|
I sent this yesterday but I've not seen it on the list.
Sending it again in case it got lost on the way.
can you confirm this gets on the list pls. It may be my spam killer at fault!
The lock on my house is nothing compared to the one on the vault in the bank
down the road. It is however more than adequate for my needs.
If you want bank level of security use a commercial product so you can sue
supplier if it breaks. (Why do commercial suppliers terms disclaim
CIPE is simple and has been in regular use since before IPsec was finalised.
For a long time it wasn't even possible to get a free version of IPsec to
compile without lots of hacking - even then you needed to be an Einstein to
CIPE is by far the most secure of the "simple" IP encryption products.
Replay attacks on cipe are possible. If the overlying protocol does not
duplicate packets then you should not be using that protocol if duplicate
packets could cause a misfunction - i.e. it is not the job of CIPE to mend
There are probably some DOS attacks - maybe even to the extent of forcing
to use the master key too often. Protection against DOS attacks is very hard.
A final but important note. The Linux version of CIPE is simple, well known
and well tested and in constant use. I know of no successful attack against
it. All IPsec implementations are large complex beasts. If they are free of
program bugs this will be little short of a miracle. Most serious crypto
software fails for that reason.
Then there are configuration errors! Human error is the the number one
point in any system - crypto or otherwise.