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To: "Email List: Cipe" <cipe-l,AT,inka,DOT,de>
Subject: Re: Relevant information
From: "Dave Howe" <DaveHowe,AT,cmn,DOT,sharp-uk,DOT,co,DOT,uk>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2003 11:32:53 +0100
References: <000e01c3860a$6d169fa0$d620a8c0@pcw_hans.hnsasd.priv> <3F79BA93.4020009@hp.com> <200309301951.17616.steegers@steegers.nl>

Op dinsdag 30 september 2003 19:17, schreef u:
> Rewriting history Hans?  What was surprising in the discovery of
> differential crypt-analysis wasn't how weak DES was, but how strong
> the addition of S-Boxes made it to this new form of attack.  Biham
> and Shamir's work probably exposes the limits of what the NSA knew
> in the '70s, but trying to describe NSA's attempt to strengthen DES
> against differential cryptanalysis as a fatal weakness inserted by
> NSA is just bizarre.   DES remains significantly stronger than it
> would have been without the addition of S-Boxes to IBM's original
> proposal, and Biham
I thought the NSA "weakening" was in the area of keylength, not the
s-boxes (which were protected fairly effectively by the NSA against
attacks known to the NSA but not the general community, therefore
strengthening the key they *did* allow....)


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